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Abstract
In this work, a model for legal financiers’ strategies is presented,
taking into account that the aim of a bank is to minimize the de-
fault probability of the funded company, constrained with reaching
a certain profit level. To obtain our purpose, a stochastic dynamics
optimization model is constructed and solved in closed form and a
Monte Carlo simulation involving empirical data is also implemented.
The financial strategies are thus obtained.
Keywords: Stochastic model; optimal control problem; firms’ external financ-
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Introduction
In the breakthrough paper of Modigliani and Miller (1958), the authors used
an arbitrage argument to prove the separability of corporate financing and in-
vestment decisions when perfect capital market assumptions hold. Modigliani
and Miller’s result can be summarized as stating the irrelevance of capital
structure when evaluating a firm’s value.
In actual fact, the life of a firm can be influenced by several events, the im-
pact of which can drastically change the evolution of the dynamics associated
with the firm’s value. We focus in this paper on an issue relevant to company
wealth, that is external financing.
Brennan and Schwartz (1978) is the starting point of quantitative studies in
the search for optimal external financing strategy. They perform a numerical
analysis to determine the optimal leverage when the wealth of the firms is
subject to a diffusion process with constant volatility. Leland (1994) shows
closed form solutions for debt values and equity values assuming infinite life
for the debts. In Leland and Toft (1996), the (very restrictive) assumption
of infinite life debt is removed.
More recently, Sethi and Taksar (2002) consider the problem of searching for
the best financing mix of retained earnings and external equity in a stochastic
framework, in order to maximize a firm’s value. For their purpose, they for-
mulate and solve explicitly a singular stochastic control problem. Sethi and
Taksar (2002) is the stochastic extension of the deterministic model stated
in Krouse and Lee (1973) and improved in Sethi (1978).
Caballero and Pindyck (1996) examine the sources of randomness in com-
pany investments and the effects of external financing on the incomes of an
industrial system. The approach they take is dynamic optimization, with
a dynamic programming perspective. The authors extend and complement
Dixit (1989) and Leahy (1991): indeed, on one hand, they adopt the view-
point of these papers and focus on the entry or exit decisions, while on the
other hand, in contrast with the quoted papers, they emphasize the effects
of different sources of uncertainty on company financing policies.
A different perspective can be found in Cifarelli et al. (2002). The authors
develop a model for choosing the best payment flow which a legal or illegal
financier has to demand from a firm in order to have a debt repaid. Cifarelli
et al. (2002) extend Masciandaro et al. (1997), and analyze the ruin proba-
bility of the firm via differential equation theory. The firm’s wealth evolves
according to a stochastic differential equation. A similar approach is also
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found in Li et al. (1996) in a different setting, where the stochastic intensity
of the debt restitution appears in the drift coefficient as an additive term.
In this work, the general framework of Cifarelli et al. (2002) is adopted, and
a company and a financier operating in a dynamic stochastic environment
are analyzed, from the financier’s point of view. Definitively, we construct
and develop an optimization problem to search for the best possible intensity
of payments which a bank should obtain from a firm in order to have a debt
repaid.
A suitable model for external financing should take the financier’s target into
account. In this respect, a bank aims at maximizing its profit, but tries to
avoid the failure of the company. The competitive scopes are pursued by the
bank as follows.
An attempt is made to avoid failure of the funded company by stating a
maximum distance-to-default problem. In doing so, the bank refers to the
evolution of company wealth dynamics, which is implicitly assumed to be
known. In fact, the bank checks the financial situation of the company be-
fore granting credit.
With respect to the minimum profit threshold, this is protected by the in-
troduction of intermediation fees and by credit spreads. The intermediation
fees are charged by the bank directly on the annuities paid by the funded
company, while the credit spread contracts concern the transfer of the risk
from the bank (protection buyer) to a third actor (protection seller). Ob-
viously, the bank also charges interest on the credit annuities. Therefore,
a constraint on the intensity of payments grounded on interest and fees is
needed.
In addition, the problem is studied up to the time in which the debt is com-
pletely repaid or the company fails. Since the date of any success or failure
of the firm is not fixed a priori, our optimization problem has a stochastic
time horizon, endogenously determined by the dynamics of the firm’s wealth.
Cifarelli et al. (2002) is the literature contribution closest to our paper, in
that we deal with the same problem -external financing of firms after credit
has been granted- from the same perspective -that of the financier. Our ap-
proach differs from Cifarelli et al. (2002), in that we construct and solve a
stochastic control problem in a dynamic programming framework. Several
monographs give a complete overview of stochastic control theory. To cite
some excellent references, we remind the reader to Borkar (1989), Fleming
and Soner (1993), Krylov (1980) and Yong and Zhou (1999). For a collection
of optimization techniques applied to real life problems, refer also to Pardalos
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and Tsitsiringos (Eds., 2002).
The model of Cifarelli et al. (2002) is so general, that it may be of interest
both to financial economists and mathematicians, as the authors stress in
the concluding section. We totally agree with this view, and we would like
to point out that our dynamic programming approach is the first to improve
on Cifarelli et al. (2002) in two important respects. First of all, we obtain an
easy, explicit form of the value function through the closed form solution of
the dynamic programming differential equation, while Cifarelli et al. (2002)
simply provide a complicated series expansion of the ruin probability of a
funded company. Secondly, in contrast with the paper we have quoted, we
are able to pinpoint the optimal strategies a bank should apply to have back
a loan in closed form.
This paper also provides a contribution to the debate on credit analysis. In-
deed, an appropriate calibration of the model on real data may allow it to be a
suitable simple instrument for banks to evaluate the structural credit spread
(we refer to the models of Merton (1974), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995),
Duan (1994), Duan et al. (2004)) or, more generally, customers’ credit risk
(see Remark 1). In this respect, the maximum value of the distance-to-
default function -the definitive aim of this research- may give insights into
the financial stability of the funded company. Unquestionably, this is a crit-
ical and urgent subject to meriting further close attention in these times of
crisis. We refer to Section 4 for discussion of this topic.
The remaining part of the paper is organized as follows. The next section is
devoted to stating the optimization problem. Section 2 contains the solution
of the problem via dynamic programming and the explicit expressions of the
optimal strategies. Section 3 contains a validation of our theoretical results
through a Monte Carlo simulation. In Section 4, we present a discussion of
the relationship between the financial stability of the funded company and
the solidity of the financing bank. The final section concludes.
1 The optimization problem
We consider a company whose wealth at time t, denoted by X(t), is described
by a controlled stochastic differential equation, as we shall see.
We also introduce a probability space with filtration (Ω,F , {Ft}t≥0, P ), where
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the filtration Ft is assumed to be cadlag and is constructed as
Ft = sigma
(
X(s), 0 ≤ s ≤ t
)
∪N , ∀ t ≥ 0,
with
N :=
{
A ∈ F |P (A) = 0
}
.
The state equation describes the stochastic evolution of the dynamic as-
sociated to the wealth of the firm. It is given by the following controlled
stochastic differential equation with initial data.
dX(t) = (µX(t)− α(t))dt+ σX(t)dW (t),
X(0) = X0
(1)
where
• µ, σ ∈ R are related, respectively, to the deterministic and stochastic
evolution of the firm’s wealth.
• α(·) is a stochastic process Ft-adapted (αt belongs to Ft), and it repre-
sents the intensity of payment corresponded by the funded firm to the
financier.
• X0 ∈ [0, K] is the initial wealth of the firm. Formally, it should be an
integrable random variable in [0, K] with law pi0, that is measurable
with respect to F0. Since it is reasonable that the initial situation of
the funded company is known, we can assume that X0 = x ∈ [0, K], x
nonrandom.
• W (·) is a standard 1-dimensional brownian motion that is independent
of pi0. It drives the stochastic term of the firm’s wealth evolution.
Remark 1. The dynamics of the value of the firm in (1) was introduced in
Merton (1974) in the context of pricing models for corporate liabilities using
an option valuation approach; this model and its extensions -among them
Duan (1994), Duan et al. (2004), Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Anderson
and Sundaresan (2000)- are typically referred to as structural credit spreads
or risky bond models. In agreement with Modigliani-Miller Theorem, the
term α(·) in Merton (1974) is, if positive, the total dollar payout by the firm
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per unit time to its shareholders or liability-holders -i.e. dividends or interest
payments, respectively- while, if negative, the net amount in dollars received
by the firm from new financing. In our case, we deal with positive α(·), and
we refer specifically to interest payments. This interpretation of the process
α(·) in equation (1) should be taken into account to explain the meaning of
the distance-to-default of the funded company and the related value function
of the optimization problem (see also Barone et al., in press).
Remark 2. The bound values 0 and K are absorbing barriers for the dynamic
of the wealth of the firm, which evolves under the pressure of the payment of
the debt. When the wealth of the firm reaches the value 0, then we have the
company’s failure; if the firm’s wealth reaches the value K, then the loan can
be extinguished. The restitution threshold K has to be interpreted as a level
of firm’s wealth where the funded company is able, but not obliged to repay
the debt.
Remark 3. There exists a unique solution for the controlled equation (1)
(we remind the reader, for example, to Øksendal 1995)).
By Remark 3, and fixed x ∈ (0, K) and α ∈ R+, we denote the unique
solution of (1) as Xαx (·).
Let us denote with T the set of the stopping times in [0,+∞), i.e.
T := {τ : Ω→ [0,+∞] | {τ ≤ t} ∈ Ft, ∀ t ≥ 0}, (2)
and let us define the exit time τ(0,K) of the dynamic from (0, K) as
τ(0,K) := inf
{
t ≥ 0 |Xαx (t) /∈ (0, K)
}
, (3)
Since Ft is cadlag, then τ ∈ T .
The optimization problem reflects the financial targets of the bank, when
financing a company. With this respect, two competitive scopes, as already
preannounced in the Introduction, should be taken under consideration in
defining the value function and the admissible region:
• the default of the funded company should be avoided. Indeed, if the
company were to fail, financial distress would also be experienced by
the bank, since there would be no real guarantees of repayment of even
part of the loan;
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• a minimum profit threshold should be obtained by the bank.
Hence, the value function V is
V (x) := min
α∈A
P (Xαx (τ(0,K)) = 0), (4)
where the admissible region of the problem is
A :=
{
α : [0,+∞)× Ω→ [δ1, δ2] ⊂ R+ such that
K1 + E
[ ∫ τ(0,K)
0
αte
−δtdt
]
≥ K2, αt ∈ Ft, ∀ t ≥ 0
}
. (5)
e−δ is the uniperiodal discount factor, and it is assumed to be constant, in
line with Cifarelli et al. (2002). It has to be intended as a market discount
factor.
δ1 and δ2 are, respectively, the lower and the upper bounds for the intensity of
payments. They can be obtained by multiplying the minimum and maximum
possible loan interest rates to the initial amount of the debt1.
V formalizes the problem of the maximization of the distance to company’s
default, that is a standard target in credit risk theory (see Remark 1).
K1 and K2 are nonnegative constants: K2 is the amount of the original debt
of the firm while K1 is an initial amount that the funded company has to pay
to the bank, and it concerns the bureaucracy expenses needed to establish
the terms of the contract. It is worth noting that if an equity condition holds,
then K2 should be equal to the expected discounted value of the annuities
αt, with the addition of K1. More formally, fairness of the loan imposes that
K1 + E
[ ∫ τ(0,K)
0
αte
−δtdt
]
= K2. (6)
It is well-known that such a fairness is sometimes violated, and the LHS of
equation (6) may be greater than the RHS. Therefore, the condition in (5)
assumed in our model is more realistic, in that it is more general.
The presence of the budget constraint in (5) implies a change in the normal
1The loan interest rates are constrained in a range, that is theoretically determined in
each Country by the laws against usury (see Masciandaro, 2001). In the actual practice,
the loan interest rates vary in a narrower range, according also to the ranking of the funded
company. As we shall see, the available data suggest us to adopt the latter perspective in
our simulation analysis.
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upper and lower bound for the intensity of payments, which the financier
must arrange with the firm. We should replace δ1 and δ2 with δ
B
1 and δ
B
2 .
Typically, the only change appears on the lower bound δ1, since δ2 cannot be
responsible for violating profit conditions. A simple example of what happens
follows.
Proposition 4. Suppose that αt = α ∈ R+, for each t > 0. Moreover,
assume
δ1 ≥ δ[1 +K2 −K1]. (7)
Then it results
K1 + E
[ ∫ τ(0,K)
0
αte
−δtdt
]
≥ K2. (8)
Proof. If αt = α is constant, then (8) can be written as
K1 + E
[α
δ
(1− e−δτ(0,K))
]
≥ K2,
that is equivalent to
K1 +
α
δ
− E[e−δτ(0,K) ] ≥ K2,
and so
α ≥ δ
[
K2 −K1 + E[e−δτ(0,K) ]
]
≥ K2. (9)
Let us observe now that, for each ω ∈ Ω, e−δτ(0,K)(ω) ∈ (0, 1). Then (7) implies
(9), that is equivalent to (8) and the result is completely proved. 2
We omit hereafter the superscript B in δ1 and δ2, but we stress that the
upper and lower bound of the admissible intensity of payments are to be
read as modified by the intervention of the profit constraint condition in (5).
2 Solution of the problem and optimal strate-
gies
The strategy we have adopted to solve the optimization problem is the dy-
namic programming approach. In this context, the value function can be
viewed as a classical solution of a second order differential equation, namely
the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman (HJB) equation. The proof of the dynamic
programming equation follows from the related maximum principle. For de-
tailed discussion, we refer to Fleming and Soner, (1993). We formalize the
dynamic programming equation in our framework, and omit the proof.
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Theorem 5 (HJB Equation). Suppose that V ∈ C2((0, K)) ∩ C0({0, K}).
Define
Ha(x) := (µx− a)V ′(x) + 1
2
σ2x2V ′′(x).
Then
sup
a∈[δ1,δ2]
Ha(x) = 0, ∀ x ∈ (0, K), (10)
with the boundary conditions
V (0) = 0, V (K) = H, (11)
where H is a positive constant relative to the income of the financier, when
the company is able to repay completely the debt.
The optimal strategies of the dynamic stochastic optimization problem
we are studying are implied by the existence and uniqueness of the classical
solution for equation (10), with boundary conditions (11), as we shall see
below. Theorem 5 states that equation (10)-(11) can be written under some
regularity conditions for V . The problem of proving the regularity of the
value function, that is only assumed in Theorem 5, is overcame in our model,
since we find a closed form solution of equation (10)-(11). The following
result holds.
Theorem 6. 1. There exists a∗ ∈ [δ1, δ2] such that
Ha∗(x) = sup
a∈[δ1,δ2]
Ha(x), (12)
for each x ∈ [0, K].
2. There exists an unique solution of the equation (10)-(11).
3. The function
V (x) = C
∫ x
0
exp
{
− 2a
∗
σ2t
− 2µ
σ2
logt
}
dt, (13)
with
C = H ·
(∫ K
0
exp
{
− 2a
∗
σ2t
− 2µ
σ2
logt
}
dt
)−1
, (14)
is the solution of the Hamilton Jacobi Bellman Equation (10)-(11).
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Proof.
1. Fixed x ∈ [0, K], then Ha(x) is a continuous function of the variable
a in the compact set [δ1, δ2]. By Weierstrass’ Theorem, we obtain the
thesis.
2. The proof comes out from the standard existence and uniqueness the-
orem for systems of first order ordinary differential equations.
3. Let us consider a∗ the same as in the first point of this theorem. (10)
can be written as
(µx− a∗)γ(x) + 1
2
σ2x2γ′(x) = 0, x ∈ (0, K),
γ(x) = V ′(x), x ∈ (0, K).
(15)
By separating the variables, the first order differential equation in (15)
becomes
dγ
γ
=
2(a∗ − µx)
σ2x2
dx, (16)
and then
logγ(x) = − 2a
∗
σ2x
− 2µlogx
σ2
+ C1, C1 ∈ R. (17)
Therefore we obtain
γ(x) = C2x
− 2µ
σ2 e−
2a∗
σ2x C2 ∈ R+. (18)
These computations provide
V (x) =
∫ x
0
γ(t)dt = C2
∫ x
0
t−
2µ
σ2 e−
2a∗
σ2t + C3, C3 ∈ R. (19)
By imposing the boundary conditions (11), we get the thesis.
2
Remark 7. A direct consequence of Theorem 6 is that V is strictly increasing
in (0, K). For a discussion of this result, see Section 4.
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The optimal strategies of our stochastic control problem can be theoret-
ically identified by proving a Verification Theorem. To achieve this aim, we
start from the HJB equation (10)-(11). More precisely, we use the results
in Theorems 5 and 6. We enunciate the Verification Theorem in our setting
and we omit the proof, since our result is already contained in a more general
theory. We remind the reader to Fleming and Soner (1993).
Theorem 8 (Verification Theorem). Assume that u ∈ C0([0, K])∩C2({0, K})
be a solution of (10)-(11).
Then it results
• (a) u(x) ≥ V (x), ∀ x ∈ [0, K].
• (b) Let us consider (α∗, x∗) an admissible couple at x such that
α∗ ∈ argmaxa
{
(µx∗(t)− a)V ′(x∗(t)) + 1
2
σ2(x∗(t))2V ′′(x∗(t))
}
. (20)
Then (α∗, x∗(t)) is optimal at x and it results u(x) = V (x), ∀x ∈ [0, K]
Theorem 8 contains the formalization of the optimal controls related to
our stochastic control problem. In particular, condition (20) implies that the
optimal controls α∗ are bang-bang controls. Indeed, by (20) we have:
α∗(x) =

δ2 for x | V ′(x) < 0
δ1 for x | V ′(x) > 0
arbitrary for x | V ′(x) = 0
(21)
Since V is strictly increasing, as already noticed above, we have that
Γ := {x ∈ [0, K] |V ′(x) ≤ 0} = ∅. (22)
Therefore,
α∗(x) = δ1, (23)
for each x ∈ [0, K].
The best strategy is always to require the lowest possible intensity of pay-
ments, under the budget constraints.
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3 Monte Carlo simulation results
This section contains a validation of our theoretical results through simula-
tions. Starting from empirical data, we aim at deriving the payment flow α
which can maximize the distance to default function V (x). The results will
also be discussed.
The payment flow α is given by the product of the loan interest rate i and
the debt amount D. To fit better with the available data, we will deal with
the analysis of the optimal loan interest rate i, which will lead to the optimal
intensity of payment α.
We here present the cases of small, medium and large companies, by consid-
ering the values X0 = 100, X0 = 500 and X0 = 1000 as starting points for
the dynamics of a firm’s wealth.
The initial amount of the loan D is assumed to be prudentially given as the
20% of the value X(0). Hence we have D = 20, D = 100 and D = 200 for
small, medium and large companies, respectively.
A prudential restitution threshold K can be given as the sum of the initial
wealth of the firm and more than double the debt amount D. So we assume
K = 150, K = 750 and K = 1500 for small, medium and large companies,
respectively.
Via a Monte Carlo simulation, we build 1000 different trajectories of the
firm’s wealth X in equation (4), where we replace α with i ·D; to this pur-
pose, the loan interest rate i is assumed to vary in an appropriate band,
accordingly with the empirical evidence, while the other parameter values
are fixed:
• the lower bound iL of the loan interest rate should be considered null,
and thus δ1 = iL ·D = 0. We will apply iL = 0 in our simulations. In
practice, the Bank of America Merrill Lynch EMU average of corpo-
rate non financial retention yield2 for firms classified as AAA is about
2.613%, while for those classified as BBB is about 3.629%. Therefore,
we stress that a value of about 2.5% can be viewed as a lower threshold
for the loan interest rate which satisfies the budget constraints in (5).
Moreover, although the upper bound of the legal interest rate may be
generally considered quite high, according to the country laws against
usury, the loan interest rate of 3.629% is the highest used in its financ-
ing practice by Merrill Lynch. Hence, we can prudentially fix the upper
2Source: Data Stream; data refer to 9th July 2010.
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bound for the loan interest rate iU at 5%, thus δ2 = iU · D = 1, 5, 10
for small, medium and large companies, respectively;
• µ = 1 + ρ = 1.001, where ρ is the revaluation rate of the company;
• σ = 0.01.
The simulation procedure for the three cases of small, medium and large
companies is implemented as follows:
• the Brownian Motion is discretized as dW (t) = Λ ∗ √∆t, where Λ
is a random number extracted by a centered normal distribution and
∆t = 1;
• we consider a discretization of the range [0, 0.05] of the loan interest
rate i with a step equal to 0.001; we denote each value of i as is (s =
1, . . . , 5.000)
• we identify time-points as days and we consider 1000 points to construct
each trajectory in order to analyze the evolution of the firm’s wealth
for a period of approximately three years;
• fixed is, 1000 trajectories X isj (j = 1, . . . , 1000) are built 3;
• for each X isj we derive the time τ isj in which, for the first time, the
trajectory of X isj hits the barrier {0, K}.
Let nis be the number of the τ isj such that X
is
j (τ(0,K)) = 0; we calculate for
each value of is the probability considered in equation (4) as follows
P (X isj (τ(0,K)) = 0) =
nis
1000
= his . (24)
For each value of is the average τ
is of the nis values τ isj for whichX
is(τ(0,K)) =
0 is also derived.
As a result we obtain:4
3When the 1000 trajectories Xisj , each made up of 1000 points, are traced, the value
is increases by 0.001 and then, in relation to this new value of the loan interest rate, we
determine further 1000 trajectories of 1000 points, and so on.
4Data are available upon request.
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1. the level i of the loan interest rate needed to minimize the default
probability of the funded company is very close to the lower actual
empirical level of the Bank of America Merrill Lynch EMU average of
corporate non financial retention yield, such as to the previously quoted
rate of 2.613% applied to the firms classified as AAA. In particular,
we obtain that i is equal to 2.694%, 2.591% and 2.342% for small,
medium and big firms, respectively. Therefore, the optimal intensity
of payment α is constant, as the theoretical results also show, and it is
given by α∗ = 0.02694 · 20 = 0.5388, α∗ = 0.02591 · 100 = 2.591 and
α∗ = 0.02342 · 200 = 4.684 for small, medium and large companies.
Hence, in our case, we can also argue that the level of optimal intensity
of payment α∗ decreases with respect to the firm’s size.
2. After performing a correlation analysis5 on the results obtained via
Monte Carlo simulation for P (Xα(τ(0,K)) = 0) and τ
α we have that:
• the probability P (Xα(τ(0,K)) = 0), obviously, increases with re-
spect to the interest rate α;
• the average τα of the values of the ταj for which Xα(τ(0,K)) = 0,
obviously, decreases with respect to α.
4 Discussion: the financial stability of the
company
In the analysis previously performed, no attempt has been made to describe
the decision criteria adopted by the banks when granting credit to com-
5It is possible to analyze such results for each firm size in Table 1 in detail. Because of
the very low level of correlation values, expected (as standard econometric theory suggests)
with a remarkable amount of information as in this case, we also performed a simple linear
regression analysis of P (Xα(τ(0,K)) = 0) and τα on α. In this way, the results regarding
the correlation’s directions have been confirmed. We report in detail them for each firm
size in each of the regressions in Table 2; once more, having a considerable amount of data
and because the aim of these regressions is to receive confirmation about the sign (and
subsequently about the causality direction) of the regression parameters, it is possible to
understand why there is a very low R2 associated to any simple linear regression. In any
case, the t-tests allow us to be confident of a probability of 95% in the value, and so in
the sign, of any regressor’s coefficient and, as a consequence, it is possible to confirm the
results reported in Table 1 regarding the correlation’s direction.
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X0 = 100 X0 = 500 X0 = 1000
ρ(P (Xα(τ(0,K)) = 0), α) 0.006 0.015 0.014
ρ(τα, α) -0.012 -0.0055 -0.018
Table 1: Correlations between the quantities obtained via Monte Carlo Sim-
ulation.
Independent variable X0 = 100 X0 = 500 X0 = 1000
P (Xα(τ(0,K)) = 0) 0.03 (0.010) 0.384 (0.016) 0.71 (0.064)
τα -0.00006 (0.00003) -0.00014 (0.000016) -0.0009 (0.00006)
Table 2: Results of the Regressions between the quantities obtained via
Monte Carlo Simulation. Dependent variable: α. The Table summarizes
the values of the parameters β for the linear relation between α and the
independent variable. Each value of β is significative at 5% referring to a
bilateral test; standard error in brackets; the number of observations is 5000.
panies6. In particular, we have focused on what happens after the positive
decision taken by the bank to finance a firm, and the solution of the distance-
to-default maximization problem does not guarantee either the achievement
of the threshold K (success of the firm) or the non occurrence of bankruptcy
(default case). We strongly stress that, once the positive decision is taken
by the bank, the analysis contained above is very general. More precisely,
we have theoretically proven that the optimal strategy α∗(x) = δ1 does not
depend on the constitutive parameters of the wealth evolution of the firm,
i.e. x, µ and σ. Needless to say, the bank checks the financial situation of the
company before granting credit. This, in our opinion, is the relationship be-
tween the lender and the borrower. Aspects regarding the decision itself are
out of the scope of the present study, and we leave them to future research.
Indeed, a more complicated model is needed to develop this intriguing topic,
6Among the most widespread techniques using for assessing the credit risk, refer to
the multivariate econometric and statistical methods, such as logit and probit regressions,
linear and quadratic discriminant analysis and cluster analysis; reviews on potentialities,
limits and applications of such procedures in relation to the credit scoring are available in
Altman (1968, 1989), Altman and Saunders (1998), Altman and Sabato (2005), Altman
et al. (1977, 1998), Carrara and Cavalli (1996), Gilbert et al. (1990) and Gordy (2000,
2003). Recent studies have considered some new non-parametric methods such as neural
networks, support vector machines, classification trees and mathematical programming;
among the others, Baesens et al. (2003) and Baourakis et al. (2009).
15
and the complex nature of this economic problem may be captured only by
inserting more ingredients into the analysis. However, we can also argue that
the riskier the company, the more dangerous it is for the bank to grant credit.
For the analysis of the implications of the financial instability of the funded
company on the solidity of the financing bank, we first need to point out
the conditions related to a firm’s financial stability. In our simplified model,
three factors may affect the health of a company:
• the parameter µ synthesizes the deterministic trend associated to the
evolution of the firm’s wealth. The larger the value of µ, the stronger
the positive trend. Therefore, a large value of µ is a desirable condition
to contribute to a safe company;
• the initial value x can be interpreted as a measure of the initial distance-
to-default of the company. As x approaches 0, then it is more difficult
for the firm to reach the upper bound K and restitute the debt. Hence,
we can say that a great initial firm value may be viewed as a condition
for the financial stability of the funded company;
• the volatility σ is a measure of the financial health of the company, in
that the higher the level of volatility, the riskier the dynamics of the
firm’s wealth.
For the sake of simplicity and without loss of generality, we discuss how the
financial distress of the funded firm influences the value function by allowing
just one of the parameters to vary, leaving the others unchanged.
We have already theoretically obtained that the value function is increasing
with respect to x (see Remark 7). To discuss the behavior of V with respect to
µ and σ, we proceed by numerical approximation, as the integrals appearing
in (13) involve complicated truncated Gamma functions.
Now, fix x ∈ [0, K]. According to (13) and (23), define:
V˜x : [0,+∞)× [0,+∞)→ [0, 1] such that (σ, µ) 7→ V˜x(σ, µ),
with
V˜x(σ, µ) = H ·
∫ x
0
exp
{
− 2δ1
σ2t
− 2µ
σ2
logt
}
dt∫ K
0
exp
{
− 2δ1
σ2t
− 2µ
σ2
logt
}
dt
. (25)
16
K x δ1 µ¯ σ¯
100 50 0.25 1.001 0.04
Table 3: Parameter set.
We consider two values for µ and σ, say µ¯ and σ¯, and study the behavior of
V˜x(σ¯, µ) and V˜x(σ, µ¯). In the former case, µ ∈ [0.0001, 0.001], while in the
latter case σ ∈ [0.1, 10].
Table 3 contains the parameter set used to perform our simulations. Figure
1 shows the shape of Vx(σ¯, µ), while Figure 2 contains the graph of Vx(σ, µ¯).
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE.
INSERT FIGURE 2 ABOUT HERE.
The scenario analysis of the firm’s default probability is particularly useful
if the dynamics of the firm’s wealth is partially unclear and the parameters
µ and σ are unknown. The results agree in stating that the value function
decreases as the company becomes less safe. This finding can be interpreted
as a recommendation for the financing bank. Indeed, if the preliminary check
of financial stability of the company performed by the bank evidences that the
adoption of the best strategy leads to a small probability of company default,
then the funded firm may be in a situation of severe financial distress. This
result sounds reasonable, in that one can conjecture that a large distance-to-
default at the optimal level of intensity of payments is a companion element
of a high default probability when the intensity of payment is not optimal.
Substantially, the lower the minimum default probability, the higher the
maximum default probability, where minimum and maximum have to be
intended with respect to α. Therefore, a low level of value function may be
associated with a unstable firm, with wealth which is particularly sensitive
to the variations of economic parameters.
Further studies need to be carried out in order to elaborate a definitive theory
on this topic.
5 Conclusions
In this work, the best intensity of payment which a bank has to apply to a
funded company has been explored. For this reason, a dynamic stochastic
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optimization problem has been constructed and developed. The aim of the
legal financier is to maximize the distance-to-default function, i.e. the prob-
ability that the funded firm repays its debt in full. The solution strategy
is analytically attained: the best intensity of payment is the lowest possible
which satisfies the bank’s budget constraints.
The theoretical results are confirmed when the optimization problem is tack-
led via a Monte Carlo simulation procedure involving empirical data. In
this case, findings show that (i) the optimal level of the payment flow is very
close to the one generated by lower bound of the actual interest rate variation
range, and it decreases as the firm’s size increases; (ii) the default probabil-
ity of the company increases with respect to the level of payment flow; (iii)
the average of the times values for which the company fails decreases as the
intensity of payment increases.
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